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Abstract
We employ proprietary data from a large bank to analyze how – in times of crisis – depositors
react to a bank nationalization, re-privatization and an accompanying increase in deposit in-
surance. Nationalization slows depositors fleeing the bank, provided they have sufficient trust
in the national government, while the increase in deposit insurance spurs depositors below the
new 100K limit to deposit more. Prior to nationalization, depositors bunch just below the then-
prevailing 20K limit. But they abandon bunching entirely during state-ownership, to return
to bunching below the new 100K limit after re-privatization. Especially depositors with low
switching costs are moving money around. (100 words)
Keywords: deposit insurance; coverage limit; bank nationalization; depositor heterogeneity
JEL Codes: G21, G28, H13, N23
∗Corresponding author. Email: Sumeyra.Atmaca@UGent.be. Ongena acknowledges financial support from ERC
ADG 2016 - GA 740272 lending.
1 Introduction
In response to the global financial crisis EU governments increased the coverage of their national de-
posit guarantee schemes in a coordinated manner. The Belgian government for example intervened
early, in November 2008 already, by increasing the coverage of the deposit insurance scheme from
20,000 to 100,000 euros, henceforth labeled, ”20K” and ”100K” (Belgisch Staatsblad, 17/11/2008).
Each depositor was insured for an amount of 100K euros per bank. This expansion of the coverage
held separately for savings certificates, such that well-informed depositors, by making the ”right
transfers” from deposits to savings certificates, could be covered for a total of 200K euros per bank.
The stated aim was to stop withdrawals by depositors with the objective of maintaining financial
stability. Previous studies have shown that the presence of deposit insurance has indeed the po-
tential to maintain and/or restore confidence in the banking sector and to increase the volume of
deposits held at banks (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Chernykh and Cole, 2011; Karas et al., 2013;
Boyle et al., 2015; Nys et al., 2015).
But observers at the time suggested on the other hand that the increase in coverage went hand
in hand with an increased awareness about the details of the deposit guarantee scheme, in effect
”waking up” the depositors. It may have been the case in Belgium; locals for example started to
google the word ”depositogarantie” (the Dutch word for deposit guarantee) substantially more in
the run-up to the expansion of the coverage than before. This increase in awareness can accordingly
be seen from the Google Trends data in Figure 1. A reasonable reaction of depositors to the news
about the expansion in coverage would be to take the newly announced threshold of 100K into
account in their future decision-making. This could be viewed as a manifestation of the availability
heuristic (see Tversky and Kahneman (1973)). The availability heuristic entails that people attach
higher subjective probabilities to information that is more readily available in their mind. This
would imply that depositors would react to the expansion in coverage by transferring money in
excess of 100K (and that importantly would not have been covered before!) to savings certificates
within the same bank (to avoid switching costs) or to covered products in other banks as to make
the most of the newly offered protection.
The implication is that the expansion in deposit insurance coverage, although it may protect the
banking system as a whole by diminishing the probability of an actual bank run, may also have
heterogeneous effects on individual depositor behavior. Indeed, small depositors below or somewhat
above 20K now feel safer and may decide to deposit more after the expansion in coverage. However,
depositors that are close to or above the 100K can be expected to feel less comfortable depositing
more in their deposit account, because they then miss out on the extra protection offered by
transferring the money in excess of 100K to savings certificates or to other accounts with other
banks. Next to stabilizing the system as a whole, the effect of the increased awareness about
the higher coverage could therefore also entail an increase in volatility of the money deposited on
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accounts above 100K, and some resulting inefficiency as deposit money spreads across many bank
accounts held at multiple banks.
In addition to the changes in coverage, many EU banks saw episodes of nationalization that were
well publicized at the time. These nationalizations usually entailed an explicit or implicit blanket
guarantee for all depositors, since a just nationalized bank is very unlikely to fail its depositors
in the immediate aftermath of the nationalization. One could therefore expect that depositors of
nationalized banks will largely disregard the information about the official coverage limit during
episodes of nationalization. The hypothesized effect of paying more attention to the increased
deposit insurance coverage limits is therefore expected to diminish or even disappear during the
spell of state ownership.
In this study we show how individual depositors react to the expansion of the deposit insurance
coverage limit from 20K to 100K and to bank nationalization. For this purpose we employ pro-
prietary monthly data of Belgian customers of one European bank. Our paper therefore uniquely
contributes to three major but intimately related strands in the banking literature, i.e., on the role
of bank depositors, deposit insurance and bank (state) ownership, respectively. Indeed, a large em-
pirical literature provides estimates on the importance and specificity of depositors funding (e.g.,
Gilje (2019)), monitoring (e.g., Oliveira et al. (2015)), at times withdrawing (e.g., Brown et al.
(2020); Schoors et al. (2019)) and/or switching (e.g., Kiser (2002); Shy (2002)), and occasionally
even running on their banks. Recent seminal papers on bank depositor runs for example high-
light the role played by depositor-bank relationships and networks (Iyer and Puri, 2012; Iyer et al.,
2016b).
But deposit insurance, or the lack or limitation of it, is never far away from the depositors‘ (and
the bankers‘) mind.1 The introduction of explicit deposit insurance in Gropp and Vesala (2004) for
example ”wakes up” the newly explicitly uninsured depositors. Testing their model using EU bank
level data, they find evidence that explicit deposit insurance may serve as a commitment device to
limit the safety net and spur monitoring by uninsured subordinated debt holders. They also find
that the introduction of explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the share of insured deposits
in banks’ liabilities.2 Our study in contrast focuses on an expansion in the existing (explicit)
deposit insurance coverage,3 adds a detailed analysis of depositor bunching prior to and after this
expansion and covers a period with changes in bank ownership, i.e., with a nationalization and a
re-privatization moment. While bank ownership has been linked to its management and lending
1Anginer and Demirguc-Kunt (2019) review this vast literature.
2Because uninsured depositors may avoid weaker banks, bank competition may lead to their further weakening
and their default if bank capital requirements are set too low (Egan et al., 2017).
3Our paper thereby complements unpublished work by Iyer et al. (2016a) who study a run on uninsured deposits
in Danish banks triggered by a reform that limits deposit insurance coverage. They show that the reform caused
a 50 percent decrease in deposits above the insurance limit in nonsystemic banks, but a much smaller decrease in
systemic banks.
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(e.g., Sapienza (2004)), we are not aware of empirical work with micro data investigating how
depositors change their money allocation depending on their bank‘s ownership.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the data and methodology
and in section 3 we present the results from our main regressions and various robustness checks.
We analyze the relevance of the thresholds imposed by the deposit insurance limits in section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and Methodology
2.1 Data
To analyze the impact of the increased deposit insurance coverage during the bank’s nationalization
and re-privatization on depositors’ behavior we use panel data of a sample of more than 300,000
Belgian customers of a European bank (henceforth, ”the bank”). The data is available to us on a
monthly basis from December 2005 until November 2012. In the empirical analysis we focus on the
period from six months before the deposit insurance increase in November 2008 until six months
after the re-privatization in 2009.4
We have information on the end-of-month balance of all deposit accounts. Figure 2 shows the
evolution of total deposits at the bank during the years 2008 and 2009. The bank loses a considerable
amount of deposits during the height of the financial crisis. The withdrawals only slowed down
when the deposit insurance limit was increased from 20K to 100K euros in November 2008. Shortly
afterwards deposits started to flow back in and by end of 2009 they reached the same overall level
as in the beginning of 2008. In Figure 3 we show the evolution of deposits of various sizes. The left
figure only includes deposits of less than 20K, the middle figure includes deposits between 20K and
100K and the right figure shows deposits of more than 100K. All three depositor groups withdrew
deposits before the increase in the deposit insurance coverage in November 2008 but depositors with
less than 20K, i.e., those covered by deposit insurance, started withdrawing later than depositors
with larger deposit balances. The increase in deposit insurance seems to have been effective as
withdrawals slowed down immediately and deposits started flowing back soon afterwards. The
latter effect is particularly pronounced for the newly covered deposits between 20K and 100K and
also for deposits above 100K which are now covered to a much larger extent than before the coverage
increase.
The previous literature shows that the introduction or change of deposit insurance makes depositors
more aware of the details of the deposit insurance scheme. In Figure 4 we show that this is also the
case in our setting. The figure shows the distribution of deposits around the ”old” deposit insurance
4To ensure the anonymity of the bank that provided us with its proprietary data, we cannot be more specific
about the nationalization and re-privatization dates.
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threshold of 20K euros (figures on the left) and around the ”new” threshold of 100K euros (figures
on the right). Panel (a) of Figure 4 depicts the situation before the increase in deposit insurance,
while Panel (b) and (c) refer to the periods after the increase in the deposit insurance limit when
the bank is nationalized and re-privatized, respectively. In all periods, the distribution of deposits
around 20K is very similar. In contrast, the distribution of deposits around the 100K threshold
changes considerably over the three time periods. After the increase of the deposit insurance limit
to 100K, there are more and more deposits just at the 100K threshold or closely below, while
there are fewer larger deposits, in particular after the bank is re-privatized. At this moment, any
implicit unlimited government guarantee came to its end and the actual deposit insurance limit of
100k became binding. These results are first evidence that depositors with relatively large deposit
balances are not only aware of the deposit insurance reform, but also of the implications of the
changes in bank ownership.
For the empirical analysis, we further restrict the sample to deposits ∈ ]1K,100K].5 This leaves us
with 160,546 depositors and 2,155,164 depositor-month observations in our main estimation sample.
Table 1 provides summary statistics and Appendix Table A.1 detailed descriptions of all variables
that we employ in our regression analysis.
2.2 Methodology
2.2.1 Identification and empirical specification
We employ the change in the deposit insurance coverage together with the nationalization and
re-privatization events in our identification strategy. In November 2008, the coverage of the deposit
insurance in Belgium was increased from 20K to 100K euros. In addition, during our observation
period the bank was first nationalized and then re-privatized. We can therefore study a period
of increased deposit insurance coverage during state ownership and a period of increased coverage
during private ownership. Deposit insurance should in principle only play a role for non-state-
owned banks because deposits at state-owned banks are generally assumed to be insured implicitly
by the state, irrespective of the amount of deposits. This set-up gives us the opportunity to study
depositor behavior in reaction to a change in the deposit insurance coverage under different bank
ownership types (i.e., state vs. private), but at the same bank. This means that the organizational
structure, the used technologies and the staff at the branches, among others, are for all practical
purposes the same during these periods and should therefore not influence depositors’ decisions.
We use a difference-in-differences estimator to evaluate the impact of increased deposit insurance
during the bank’s state/private ownership periods on depositor behavior. As dependent variable,
we use the monthly change in the natural logarithm of deposits Δln(deposits) and estimate the
5We drop deposits below 1K throughout the paper because these deposits might not represent true savings but
represent inactive ”shell” accounts. Deposits >100K are included in the analysis in a robustness test.
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following regression:
Δln(depositsi,t+1) = β1depositsi,t ∈]20K, 100K] + β2statet + β3statet ∗ depositsi,t ∈]20K, 100K]
+ β4privatet + β5privatet ∗ depositsi,t ∈]20K, 100K] +αZi,t + μi + εi,t, (1)
where subscripts i and t stand for individual depositor and time (i.e., year:month), respectively.
As the treatment group, we define deposits between 20K and 100K euros, and as the control group,
deposits below 20K. The former class of deposits was only partially insured (i.e., up to 20K) before
the reform but became fully insured after the reform, while the latter class of deposits was fully
insured before and after the reform. Hence, the treatment variable deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] is equal
to 1 if deposits are >20K and up to 100K, and equal to 0 otherwise. Note that in our baseline
regressions treatment status varies not only between depositors but can also vary within depositors
over time. As we are interested in estimating the effect of the increase in the deposit insurance,
we also want to capture depositors who increase their deposit balances from below the old 20K
threshold to above given the extended coverage after the reform. We then compare deposit growth
rates in the treatment and control groups during three periods. In the pre-period the bank is
private and the deposit insurance limit is 20K, while the financial crisis is hitting with the failure
of Lehman as a major event. β1 thus accounts for differences in deposit growth rates between the
treatment and control groups in the pre-period. We expect an insignificantly estimated coefficient
β1 if all depositors are worried by the crisis in a similar way, and a significantly negative estimate
if the control group, which is covered by the deposit insurance, is aware of and trusts its coverage.
The first treatment period is characterized by the deposit insurance limit being increased to 100K
and the bank being in state ownership. Therefore, state is a dummy that is 1 during the period of
increased deposit insurance coverage and state ownership and 0 otherwise. β2 captures changes in
deposit growth rates in the period of increased coverage during nationalization for deposits below
20K (control group). β3 then accounts for the additional change in deposit growth for deposits
between 20K and 100K as compared to deposits below 20K during the period of state ownership
and measures the first treatment effect. In principal, state ownership should have introduced
an informal guarantee to all deposits so that the increased formal deposit insurance limit of 100K
should only become effective when the bank is re-privatized. In any case, we expect the combination
of increased coverage and nationalization to have a calming effect on depositors which implies a
significant and positive coefficient β2 (the nationalization effect) and a significantly positive or
insignificant coefficient β3 depending on whether or not the calming effect of nationalization is
more pronounced for the newly covered deposits between 20K and 100K (the effect of increased
coverage).
private is then a dummy that is 1 during the period of increased deposit insurance limit and re-
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privatization of the bank, and 0 otherwise. In this third period, the bank is again private but
the deposit insurance limit remains at the higher 100K. Thus, β4 captures changes in deposit
growth rates in the period of increased coverage after re-privatization for deposits below 20K
(control group). β5 accounts for the additional change in deposit growth for deposits between
20K and 100K as compared to deposits below 20K when the bank is re-privatized and measures
the second treatment effect. Since we expect the increased deposit insurance coverage to have a
calming effect on treated depositors especially after re-privatization, when the implicit guarantee
of state ownership expires, we hypothesize a significant and positive coefficient β5. Since neither
re-privatisation nor increased coverage change anything much for the control group, we have no
explicit expectations for β4.
The identification of the difference-in-differences effects crucially depends on the common trend
assumption which implies that the change in deposit growth rates would have been the same in
the treatment and control groups in the absence of the increase in the deposit insurance limit
together with the bank’s change in ownership (i.e. the treatment). Figure 5 shows the change
in deposit growth rates for the treatment group (dashed line) and the control group (solid line)
between January and October 2008, i.e. in the months before the deposit insurance reform. While
changes in deposit growth rates follow a similar path for both groups and always move in the same
direction, the lines are not perfectly parallel. We will address this issue in three ways.
First, we include depositor FE (μi) in all our regressions to focus the analysis on within-depositor
changes in deposit growth rates over time. In that way we control for all unobservable time-invariant
depositor characteristics that could influence depositor behavior. Second, and to further mitigate
concerns about missing variables that might drive the change in deposit growth rates and are
correlated with the deposit balance (i.e., treatment status), we control for an array of relationship,
depositor and branch characteristics with the vector Zi,t. We have several indicators that capture
various aspects of the intensity of the bank-depositor relationship. mortgage now is a dummy that
equals 1 in those months in which the depositor has a mortgage at the bank, while mortgage ever
is a dummy that equals 1 if the depositor has ever had a mortgage with the bank during the full
sample period 2005-2012. number products indicates the number of products that the depositor has
at the bank, whereas scope refers to the number of domains from which the depositor has a product
in each month. There are five domains: daily banking, deposits and investments, loans and credits,
insurance and online banking. change branch is a dummy that equals 1 during the 12 months
after a depositor changes branches and change account manager equals 1 during the 12 months
after a depositor experiences an account manager change. The idea is that such changes might
not (only) lead to immediate changes in depositor behavior but might rather have an impact over
some time. The dummy account manager indicates periods in which depositors have an account
manager. leave account manager then equals 1 during the 12 months after the depositor’s account
manager leaves. contact ever and sales ever are dummies indicating whether the depositor has ever
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had face-to-face contact with the bank or purchased bank products during the full sample period
2005-2012, whereas contacts last year indicates the number of face-to-face contacts between the
depositor and the bank during the past year.
We also control for various depositor characteristics and life events that should affect depositor
behavior. widow, divorce and wedding are dummies that equal 1 during the 12 months after a
depositor becomes a widow(er), gets divorced or married, respectively. married man and married
woman are dummies that are 1 if the depositor is a married man or woman, respectively. In addition,
we have information on whether and how much income depositors receive on their accounts. Thus,
no income is a dummy that equals 1 if no regular income is reported or if income is missing, while
income ∈ ]0,2K], income ∈ ]2K,3.5K], income ∈ ]3.5K,5K] and income ∈ ]5K,∞] refer to the
amount of the received income with income ∈ ]3.5K,5K] as the reference group omitted from the
regressions. moved is a dummy that equals 1 during the 12 months after a depositor changes her
official residence.
We further control for branch characteristics that may drive differences in depositor behavior be-
tween branches. branch merge, branch relocation and branch status change are dummies that equal
1 during the 12 months after a branch gets merged with another branch, a branch is relocated or
a branch changes its status (statutory vs. independent), respectively. district competitors is the
number of banks that is available to the depositor besides this bank in the district of residence
and district potential indicates the market potential of the district as estimated by the bank. The
variable ranges from 1 to 5, with 5 indicating highest market potential. The information for the
variable district competitors is only available for 2008 during our sample period and the information
for branch status change is available to us on a yearly basis, while all other information is available
on a monthly basis. Lastly, in an extended specification, we add month FE to the model to account
for seasonal factors that may drive changes in deposit growth rates in general.
Third, we use Abadie’s semi-parametric difference-in-differences estimator (Abadie, 2005) as an
alternative estimation technique. Based on the relationship, depositor and branch characteristics
the estimator assigns a propensity score to weigh the trend of the untreated, i.e., it basically forces
parallel trends as much as possible based on the observable characteristics.
2.2.2 Bank-customer relationship strength
The previous literature has shown that strong bank-customer relationships mitigate deposit with-
drawal risk during crises (e.g., Brown et al. (2020). The liquidity requirements in the Basel III
regulatory framework account for this regularity by requiring banks to hold less liquidity for de-
posits originating from close customer relationships (BIS 2013). There are several reasons why
strong bank-customer relationships may mitigate deposit withdrawals during times of bank dis-
tress. Transaction costs may be high when switching to another bank, the benefits from private
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information built up in a close bank-customer relationship may be lost or the range of products
offered by the relationship bank is broader than at other banks. In a similar vein, we argue that
depositors with strong bank relationships should react less strongly in all three periods. Since
we expect them to withdraw less during the pre-period, we also hypothesize that they will react
less to increased deposit insurance and thus exhibit smaller changes in deposit growth during the
treatment periods, when deposits return. Alternatively, we cannot exclude that depositors with
strong relationships to the bank may be willing to concentrate more deposits at the bank during
the periods with increased deposit insurance coverage in order to save transaction costs, especially
if they also hold deposits at other, more transactional, banks.
To test these implications we augment our baseline model to capture the potentially differential
effect of close bank-customer relationships on the change in deposit growth rates in our treatment
and control groups and estimate the following regression:
Δln(depositsi,t+1) = β1depositsi,t ∈]20K, 100K] + β2statet + β3statet ∗ depositsi,t ∈]20K, 100K]
+ β4depositsi,t ∈]20K, 100K] ∗ relationshipi,t + β5statet ∗ relationshipi,t
+β6statet ∗ depositsi,t ∈]20K, 100K] ∗ relationshipi,t
+ β7privatet + β8privatet ∗ depositsi,t ∈]20K, 100K] + β9privatet ∗ relationshipi,t
+ β10privatet ∗ depositsi,t ∈]20K, 100K] ∗ relationshipi,t +αZi,t + μi + εi,t, (2)
where subscripts i and t stand for individual depositor and time (i.e., year:month), respectively,
and relationshipi,t is a subset of Zi,t. The vector relationshipi,t includes scope, number products,
mortgage now and income ∈ ]0,∞]6 as indicators of the closeness of bank relationships. The first
three variables measure the intensity of the relationship in terms of cross-product synergies. The
latter variable indicates whether the depositor receives income to the account at the bank. If this
is not the case, the depositor most likely has a (close) relationship with another bank and receives
income to an account there.
Our aim is to assess whether the average treatment effect of increasing the deposit insurance limit is
conditional on relationship characteristics. We hypothesize depositors with close bank relationships
to withdraw less during the pre-period, i.e., the height of the financial crisis. β4 should therefore
be significant and positive. We expect that depositors with close bank relationships will therefore
also react less to the treatment of increased coverage, implying that the coefficients β6 and β10 are
significant and negative. In contrast, if depositors with close bank relationships do have other bank
accounts and start concentrating their money at the relationship bank, we may expect β6 and β10
6income ∈ ]0,∞] comprises the variables no income, income ∈ ]0,2K], income ∈ ]2K,3.5K], income ∈ ]3.5K,5K]
and income ∈ ]5,∞] from the baseline regression so that the income situation of a depositor is condensed into one
dummy variable for ease of comparison. The variable equals 1 if the depositor receives her monthly income at the
bank
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to be significantly positive instead.
2.2.3 Trust in the government
As shown in Figure 2 above, the increase in deposit insurance coverage seems to have had a calming
effect on depositors during crisis times, i.e., depositors slowed down withdrawing money from the
bank and even started bringing money back after some time. In the next step, we will formally
evaluate whether trust in the government is the underlying mechanism. We expect that individuals
having faith in the government are more likely to halt their withdrawals upon the increase in deposit
insurance coverage. The effect should be stronger during the nationalization period because the
government involvement is most explicit here.
To study the role that trust in the government plays in potentially reinforcing an intended calming-
down effect of nationalization and increased deposit insurance coverage, we estimate the following
two regressions:
Δln(depositsi,t+1) = β1trusti,t + β2statet + β3statet ∗ trusti,t + β4privatet
+ β5privatet ∗ trusti,t +αZi,t + μi + εi,t, (3)
Δln(depositsi,t+1) = β1depositsi,t ∈]20K, 100K] + β2statet + β3statet ∗ depositsi,t ∈]20K, 100K]
+ β4depositsi,t ∈]20K, 100K] ∗ trusti,t + β5statet ∗ trusti,t
+ β6statet ∗ depositsi,t ∈]20K, 100K] ∗ trusti,t
+ β7privatet + β8privatet ∗ depositsi,t ∈]20K, 100K] + β9privatet ∗ trusti,t
+ β10privatet ∗ depositsi,t ∈]20K, 100K] ∗ trusti,t + β11trusti,t +αZi,t + μi + εi,t,
(4)
where subscripts i and t stand for individual depositor and time (i.e., year:month), respectively.
To measure trust in the government, we make use of election outcomes before the nationalization.
In particular, we take the federal election of 2007 which took place in the year before our sampling
period and is the most recent election before the increase in deposit insurance and the bank nation-
alization. A measure of general trust in the government, as compared to a measure derived from
regional elections, seems to be most appropriate because the crisis was a national phenomenon and
the federal government is the actor expected to set policies to mitigate the crisis effects. Moreover,
the electorate is expected to vote for different motives in regional elections. Thus, trust is the
canton-level number of all votes minus invalid and blank votes divided by all votes from the federal
election in 2007. The variable is scaled by subtracting the minimum and dividing by the range of
the original variable. Assuming that the fraction of invalid votes is random on the canton level,
9
the proxy measures the share of non-blank votes. The mean of this scaled variable is 0.80 (the
mean of the unscaled variable is 0.95), meaning that only a small fraction of the voters do not have
or express political preferences.7 Given that Belgium is one of the few countries where voting is
obligatory, coming to the election and voting blank can be seen as a strong sign of revealed distrust
in the national government and its policies.
With the regression in Equation 3 we first test whether trust in general helps reinforcing government
policies to contain the financial crisis. If this is the case, we expect to find significantly positive
coefficients β3 and β5. We expect β3 to be larger than β5 because the government involvement, and
hence the impact of trust in the government, is more exhaustive during the nationalization period.
In Equation 4 we then study whether the average treatment effect of an increase in the deposit
insurance coverage is conditional on depositors’ trust in the government. We expect that within
the control group the effect of trust will be larger during the period of state ownership than after
re-privatization. Indeed, as the increased deposit insurance coverage is immaterial for the control
group, trust in the nationalization is what matters. We therefore expect β5 to be larger than β9.
For the treatment group in contrast, we expect the effect of trust to be more pronounced in the
period after re-privatization than during nationalization and therefore β10 to be larger than β6.
This is because the treatment group’s trust in the increased deposit insurance coverage only starts
to matter when it becomes binding in the period after re-privatization. We expect, in short, the
effect of trust in the government on deposit growth to dominate in the period after re-privatization
for the treatment group and during nationalization for the control group.
Since the trust effects for the treatment and control groups are expected to work in opposite direc-
tions over the treatment periods, the question inasmuch the average treatment effect is conditional
on depositors’ trust depends on the relative size of the respective effects. Intuitively, one would
expect β10 to be larger than β9 and β6 to be smaller than β5. However, given that the overall
interpretation of regressions with triple interactions requires a complex summation of coefficients,
we verify these hypotheses by (graphically) analyzing the predictive margins at specified values of




We start with discussing the findings from the baseline model which are reported in Table 2.
Column (1) of Table 2 shows the results without control variables, while column (2) includes all
our relationship, depositor and branch characteristics and column (3) further adds month FEs.
7Appendix Figure A.1 shows a histogram of the scaled trust variable as we use it in our regression analysis.
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All regressions include depositor FEs. The main results are qualitatively and quantitatively very
similar across all three specifications. Only the indicators state and private are insignificant in
column (3) due to the collinearity introduced by the month FEs.
The results are in line with our reasoning above. The significantly negative coefficient on our
treatment variable deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] means that those depositors with only partial deposit
insurance coverage decrease their savings on their bank account more than the insured depositors
during the pre-period, i.e., at the height of the financial crisis. Once the increase in the deposit
insurance limit to 100K is effective, depositors slow down their withdrawals. The increased coverage
during the nationalization period leads to a calming down of all depositors given that state is
significantly positive and its interaction with the treatment variable insignificant. In contrast, the
increased coverage during the re-privatization period leads to a stronger slow-down in withdrawals
for the now covered larger deposits, i.e., the treatment group.
For an easier assessment of the economic magnitude of these effects, Table 3 shows the changes
in deposit growth rates for the control and treatment groups for the three periods we analyze by
summing up the respective significant coefficients from Table 2, column (1). The bottom line of
Table 3 reports results from a test on the significance of the difference in the changes in deposit
growth rates between the treatment and control groups. The results show that the increased
coverage during nationalization has a small effect on all depositors, while during re-privatization
the now covered larger depositors, i.e., the treatment group, slow down withdrawing money from the
bank. These findings include depositor fixed effects and therefore only reflect changes of deposit
behavior from (i.e., ”within”) the same depositor, not across depositors. They imply that the
nationalization period, which starts only two months after the Lehman failure, may still have been
considered as a time of crisis by most depositors. The calming effect of the increase in the deposit
insurance limit, that is, did only materialize once the bank was re-privatized.
To visualize the temporal pattern of the treatment effects discussed above we allow the change
in deposit growth rates to differ between the treatment and control groups in each month of our
observation period and run the following regression:
Δln(depositsi,t+1) = β1depositsi,t ∈]20K, 100K] + β2montht + β3montht ∗ depositsi,t ∈]20K, 100K]
+αZi,t + μi + εi,t, (5)
The regression results are reported in Appendix Table A.2. Figure 6 depicts the estimated values
of β3 of Equation 5 and the respective 95% confidence intervals. The figure also shows three
grey shaded areas encompassing the Lehman bankruptcy (which happened in our pre-period),
the increased coverage during nationalization and the increased coverage during re-privatization.8
8To ensure the anonymity of the bank that provided us with the data, the grey shaded areas are not exact
illustrations of the timing of these periods.
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Figure 6 shows that the treatment effect, i.e., the estimated values of β3 of Equation 5, are close to
zero during the pre-period and during the period of state ownership combined with increased deposit
insurance coverage. The only exception is the large and negative effect of the Lehman failure. A
Wald test of the joint significance of the estimated coefficients of the treatment effect during the
pre-period confirms that they are jointly insignificant as soon as the Lehman effect is excluded (see
F-statistics reported at the bottom of Appendix Table A.2). In contrast, the estimated values of
β3 become larger and positive during the period of increased coverage and re-privatization of the
bank, albeit with a small delay.
In the next step, we study the behavior of depositors in the treatment group in more detail and
divide the treatment group into four subgroups with increasing deposit balances. We thus as-
sess the impact of the deposit insurance reform on the change in deposit growth for deposits ∈
]20K,40K], ]40K,60K], ]60K,80K] and ]80K,100K]. Appendix Table A.3 reports the results for re-
gressions without and with our control variables. The results suggest that, in the pre-period at the
height of the financial crisis, depositors with relatively less insurance (a higher deposit bucket) tend
to withdraw relatively more. Again, increased deposit insurance coverage during the period of state
ownership leads to a small and almost uniform slowdown in deposit withdrawals. The increased
deposit insurance coverage during the re-privatization period again has a significantly larger effect
in the treatment than the control group. In addition, the further depositors were away from full
insurance before the reform (depositors in higher deposit buckets), the more they are calmed down
by the increased coverage during the re-privatization period.
We then extend our sample to deposits ≤200K and report the results in Appendix Table A.4. By
including deposits ∈ ]100K,200K] into our analysis we can study the impact of the increased deposit
insurance coverage on individuals that were only very partially insured before the reform (from at
most 20 % for those with 100K to 10% for those with 200K) and received five times more insurance
because of the reform (from 100% insured for those with 100k to 50% insured for those with 200K).
In line with our previous findings, we find that depositors with smaller insurance coverage in the
pre-period react by withdrawing more deposits during the crisis and are more effectively placated
by the the increased coverage in the period after re-privatization.
Overall, our baseline results suggest that the increase in the deposit insurance limit had the intended
calming effect on depositors at the height of the financial crisis in the Fall of 2008 and, even more
so, during the months following.
3.2 Robustness
We conduct several robustness tests to assess the sensitivity of our results to changes in our regres-
sion sample. We report these results in Table 4. For brevity, we only report the specifications with
control variables as results without the control variables are qualitatively and quantitatively very
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similar. First, we change the time window that we analyze and compare the four months before with
the four months after the deposit insurance reform (column (1)) and the nine months before the
reform with the nine months after the re-privatization (column (2)). Second, we increase the lower
bound of deposits that we include in our analysis sample to 5K in column (3) and to 10K in column
(4). Third, we assess potential anticipation effects as the increase of the insurance limit officially
happened in November 2008 but the minister of Finance announced the reform already one month
before. To study whether depositors reacted to this information we redefine the pre-period to until
October instead of November 2008. November 2008 will consequently be part of the state-period.
Overall, our results are robust to these changes. Interestingly, the results in columns (3) and (4)
indicate that the increased coverage during nationalization does not have a calming effect on the
control group (state) when dropping the smaller deposits of up to 5K and 10K, respectively, while
there still is a small calming effect on the larger deposits in the treatment group, as found in our
baseline results.9
Our next set of robustness tests is concerned with the exogeneity of the treatment status. In our
baseline regressions, depositors are allowed to switch between treatment and control groups at any
point during our observation period because we are interested in estimating the effect of an increase
in the deposit insurance limit. This means, for instance, that depositors with balances below 20K
(the old limit) could start concentrating their deposits at one bank due to the increased insurance
limit and would thus move from the control to the treatment group over time. In addition, the
difference-in-differences estimator relies on the assumption that in the absence of the treatment the
outcome variable of the treated and untreated follow the same trend. The parallel trend assumption
is however violated if selection into treatment is not random and determined by covariates which
also affect the outcome variable. While we control for depositor fixed effects and an array of control
variables in our baseline regression to address this concern, we cannot fully rule out that there are
unobserved factors that are correlated with the treatment status and also drive the change in
deposit growth rates.
To address these issues, we first drop depositors who change between treatment and control groups
within the three periods that we analyze (the pre-period, the period with increased coverage while
the bank is state-owned and the period with increased coverage during private ownership), i.e.,
depositors can only switch between treatment and control groups from one period to another and
not at any point in time during our observation period. We lose roughly 1,400 depositors due to
this restriction. We report the respective results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5. Overall, our
conclusions from the main analysis that the increase in the deposit insurance limit had a calming
effect on depositors at the height of the crisis and even more so a couple of months later when
the bank was re-privatized remain unchanged. However, we now do find a significantly positive
9Our baseline results are also robust to winsorizing the dependent variable at the 1st and 99th percentiles to
account for potential outliers.
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interaction term state*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K], which means that depositors with larger balances are
already more calmed down by the increase in the insurance limit during the state-ownership period
and not only during the private ownership period.10 In columns (3) and (4), we then drop deposits ∈
[10K,30K] to create a gap between the treatment and control groups. Here, we loose around 20,000
depositors from our estimation sample. Again, our results are robust except for the interaction
effect of state*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K], which turns significantly negative. One explanation could
be that we dropped the smallest deposits from the treatment group, i.e., those deposits that are
furthest away from the newly increased insurance limit of 100K. These depositors are obviously the
ones who are calmed down the most by the increased coverage during nationalization, while the
larger depositors might still be worried about the safety of their deposits during this period shortly
after the Lehman failure.
In the next step, we repeat our analysis using Abadie’s semi-parametric difference-in-differences es-
timator (Abadie, 2005). Based on the individual characteristics the estimator assigns a propensity
score to weigh the trend of the untreated. To apply the semi-parametric approach, we drop deposi-
tors who switch between treatment and control groups within each of our three periods (pre-period,
increased coverage during state ownership and increased coverage during private ownership) as we
need to classify each depositor exclusively to the treatment or control group. We then calculate
the average deposit growth for each of the two treatment periods and compute the change com-
pared with the pre-period average deposit growth to derive the dependent variable. The upper
panel of Table 6 provides the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) in the period when
the insurance coverage was increased to 100K euros and the bank was state-owned. The effect of
the increased coverage during private ownership is shown in the lower panel. Column 1 uses all
control variables to estimate the propensity score to weigh the trend of the untreated and column
2 additionally includes the month fixed effects. Similar to the baseline results, the effect on the
treated of the increased insurance limit during nationalization is positive, yet significant because
we cannot allow for switches between treatment and control groups (see above). At the same time,
the effect of the increased insurance is significantly positive and larger during the re-privatization
period as in our baseline regressions. The economic magnitude of these effects is also larger than
in the baseline specification.
Finally, we aggregate the monthly data into one observation for each depositor in each of the three
periods to ensure that standard errors are calculated correctly given the possible serial correlation
in the monthly deposits data (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 2004). Specifically, we calculate
the deposit growth within each period by considering the difference in deposits in the first and
last month of the period. The dependent variable is then the average change in deposit growth,
1/sΔln(depositsi,t+s) calculated as 1/s[ln(depositst+s) − ln(depositst)]. The results are reported
10The reason is that, by construction, we now have fewer switches from the treatment to the control group and
therefore omit these negative changes in deposit growth rates.
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in Appendix Table A.5. In columns (1) and (2) we restrict the sample to the first month in each
of the three periods to define treatment status of the depositor, while in columns (3) and (4) we
further restrict the sample to depositors who do not switch between treatment and control groups
within each of the treatment periods. The results are in line with the results from Abadie’s semi-
parametric estimator with both treatment effects being significantly positive, but the effect of the
increased insurance limit during re-privatization being larger than the effect of the increased limit
during nationalization.
Overall, while the magnitude of the effect of increased coverage during stae ownership varies some-
what across specifications, our main conclusions that the increase in deposit insurance coverage at
the height of the financial crisis had the intended calming effect and that this effect was even larger
after re-privatization remain intact.
3.3 Relationship strength
In this section, we examine whether the average treatment effect of the increased deposit insurance
coverage shown in our baseline regressions varies by relationship characteristics. In Table 7 we
therefore interact our main variables deposits ∈ ]20K,100K], state, state*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K],
private and private*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] with variables that capture relationship strength. In
column (1) we employ scope, in column (2) number products and in column (3) mortgage now as
measures of the closeness of the bank-depositor relationship in terms of cross-product synergies.
The underlying hypothesis is that depositors who currently have a broader range of bank products
(scope ∈ [0, 5]), a larger number of bank products (number products ∈ [1, 55]) or a mortgage
(mortgage now ∈ [0, 1] ), which usually constitutes a long-term contract between the bank and the
customer, face higher costs when they want to switch to another bank. Similarly, depositors who
receive a monthly income into their account at the bank can be expected to face higher switching
costs because, for instance, it is likely that they also run all their daily expenses through this
account. In column (4) we take this aspect into account by using income as the relationship variable
(income ∈ [0, 1]). The depositors with close relationships should therefore react less strongly during
the financial crisis and when the insurance limit is increased. However, during the periods with
increased deposit insurance coverage they might also be more willing to concentrate their deposits
at this bank to save, for instance, transaction costs.
Results across all four indicators of the closeness of bank-depositor relationship are very similar and
in line with our above reasoning that close relationships induce depositors to react less to the treat-
ment of increased deposit insurance during both the state- and private-ownership periods. The
significantly positive coefficient on the interaction term deposits ∈ ]20K,100K]*relationship con-
firms that depositors in the treatment group who have close relationships with the bank withdraw
less during the pre-period, i.e., at the height of the financial crisis. The significantly negative co-
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efficients on the triple interactions state*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K]*relationship and private*deposits
∈ ]20K,100K]*relationship together with the significantly positive and larger coefficients on state*
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] and private*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] further suggest that depositors in the
treatment group who have close bank relationships increase their deposit growth less strongly after
the increase in the deposit insurance coverage compared to depositors with weak bank relationships.
In contrast, we do not find evidence that depositors with close bank relationships start concentrat-
ing their deposits at the bank after the increase in the deposit insurance limit. In sum, the effect of
the increased deposit insurance limit on the bank is mitigated by strong bank-depositor relations.
As the overall interpretation of the direction and the magnitude of effects is convoluted with multi-
ple triple interactions, we present in Figure 7 the predictive margins for the treatment and control
group, conditional on the strength of the relationship, during both the state- and private-ownership
periods. The left and right panel show the state- and private-ownership periods respectively, while
the blue and black lines show the predictive margins for the treated and the control group respec-
tively. The upward slope in all panels of Figure 7 indicates that the strength of the relationship,
reflected from left to right on the horizontal axis, always contributes positively to stronger deposit
growth. We also observe that the slope of the blue line is always considerably less pronounced than
the slope of the grey line, providing empirical validation of the hypothesis that strong relationships
matter less for treated than for untreated depositors, i.e. mitigate the treatment effect.
3.4 Trust in the government
Our results so far have shown that the increase in the deposit insurance limit at the height of the
financial crisis was successful in placating depositors. We now proceed by scrutinizing the results
with respect to one potential underlying mechanism that might explain our baseline results: trust
in the government. We start with analyzing the role that trust may play in reinforcing the intended
placating effect of the increase in deposit insurance coverage during the financial crisis. We report
the estimates of Equation 3 in columns (1) and (2) of Table 8. The significantly positive interaction
terms state*trust and private*trust indicate that in cantons with higher levels of trust, depositors
tend to slow down their withdrawals more after the increase in the insurance limit. As expected,
this effect is more pronounced during the period of state ownership.
In order to obtain a net positive effect of state ownership on depositors’ inclination to stay with the
bank the canton level fraction of non-blank votes needs to be at least 0.9, which is the case in 97.5%
of the cantons. There are about 2.5% of the cantons, therefore, where trust in the government is so
low that the nationalization in fact further fuelled deposit withdrawals. Depositors in these cantons
apparently perceive the nationalization on average as a signal of serious trouble rather than as a
positive bail-out by the government. The good news is that average trust is so high that the group
of depositors perceiving nationalization as a negative stigma is very small.
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We proceed by analyzing whether the average treatment effect of an increase in the deposit in-
surance coverage that we estimated in our baseline regression is conditional on depositors’ trust
in the government. To verify the potential moderating effect of trust on treated depositors, we
interact our main variables deposits ∈ ]20K,100K], state, state*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K], private
and private*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] with our trust variable. We report the estimates of Equation
4 in columns (3) and (4) of Table 8. As expected, we find that the effect of trust dominates in the
period of state ownership for the control group with the estimated coefficient of state*trust being
larger than the estimated coefficient of private*trust. In contrast, for the treated group the effect
of trust dominates in the period of private ownership after the re-privatization given that the es-
timated coefficient of private*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K]*trust is larger than the respective coefficient
on state*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K]*trust.
As the overall interpretation of the direction and the magnitude of effects is convoluted with multiple
triple interactions, we visualize these results in Figure 8 by plotting predictive margins. The left
and right panel show the state- and private-ownership periods, respectively, while the blue and
black lines show the predictive margins for the treated and the control group respectively. In line
with our expectations we observe that during state-ownership (left panel of Figure 8) trust does
not seem to matter for the deposit behavior of treated depositors (blue line), since the effect of
increased deposit insurance coverage is dominated by the effect of being state-owned in this period.
After re-privatization (right panel of Figure 8), however, we observe that treated depositors’ deposit
growth (blue line) becomes more sensitive to trust relative to untreated depositors (grey line), as in
this period the deposit insurance coverage becomes binding and trust in the government therefore
becomes essential to understand the effect of deposit insurance on depositor behavior.
4 Threshold behavior
So far we have discussed the effectiveness of increasing the insurance coverage to calm down de-
positors during the financial crisis. In this section, we analyze to what extent individuals actually
take the insurance limits into account and how this changes over time. We quantify how much
individuals care about the maximum level of coverage by estimating sorting below the respective
limits (20K and 100K) using the method first proposed by Saez (2010) and Chetty et al. (2011).
The degree of bunching at the 20K and 100K thresholds is retrieved by considering the excess mass
which is calculated by comparing the actual distribution of deposits with a counterfactual without
a kink at those points.11
We expect that the coverage limit becomes more important during the crisis, leading to a higher
11The counterfactual is obtained by fitting a polynomial without observations in the proximity of the threshold
i.e., where bunching occurs. The fitted polynomial is then extrapolated to the threshold which was initially dropped
due to bunching. The used command is bunch count in Stata.
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number of individuals who keep their deposits below or around the then prevailing limit of 20K.
After the increase in the insurance coverage in November 2008, the 20K threshold should lose its
importance and depositors should shift their attention to the new 100K limit. However, since the
deposit guarantee scheme is most relevant for private-owned banks, we expect to see less sorting
during the period of state ownership compared to the period after re-privatization.
Figure 9 shows the degree to which individuals sort below the insurance limits to ensure that their
deposits are fully covered. The left figure shows the bunching below the 20K limit, whereas the
right figure shows the respective bunching below the 100K limit. Starting with bunching below
the 20K limit, the graph shows that, in the run up to the crisis, more and more depositors limit
their deposits to 20K for full coverage. After the increase of the insurance to 100K in November
2008, the number of accounts with deposits just below or equal to 20K drops quickly and becomes
insignificantly different from zero. Regarding the 100K threshold in the right figure, we observe
some increased bunching in the months before the deposit coverage increase suggesting that there
were some anticipation effects. This threshold behavior, in accordance with our expectations,
almost disappears during the period of state-ownership when all deposits can be expected to be
fully covered by the state. However, bunching below the 100K limit returns in full swing after the
re-privatization of the bank when the new 100K limit becomes binding for the bank’s depositors.
These findings indicate that depositors indeed are aware the changing deposit insurance limit and
react accordingly.
5 Conclusion
In November 2008 the Belgian government revised the deposit insurance scheme by increasing the
coverage from 20,000 to 100,000 euros per depositor and per bank. Our results suggest that this
reform was effective in restoring trust in banks during the crisis. Indeed, deposit growth resumes
once the deposit insurance limit is raised. Depositors with smaller insurance coverage before the
reform withdraw more deposits in the run-up to the crisis. Depositors with a larger increase in
deposit insurance coverage due to the reform increase their deposit growth most in the post-reform
period. The nationalization of the bank worked across the board in calming depositors.
The effects of deposit insurance and nationalization are modulated by the strength of the bank-
customer relationship. Captive depositors (who purchase different types of products, a mortgage,
or a large number of products from the bank, or receive their income at the bank) are less likely
to run on the bank in the first place and subsequently respond less strongly to nationalization
and to the increase in coverage to 100K after re-privatization. The reverse is true for customers
that receive their income on a bank account with another bank, because they arguably have lower
switching costs.
18
The effects are reinforced by the revealed trust in the federal government. The nationalization
has a larger positive effect on deposit growth in high-trust cantons. After re-privatization the
positive effect of the increase in deposit insurance on treated depositors is more pronounced in
high-trust cantons. Trust in the government, that is, boosts the effectiveness of federal initiatives
like nationalization or the increase in the coverage limit of the deposit insurance. This finding
should caution also other governments against squandering this trust too easily, lest not to dent
the effectiveness of two crucial stabilization policies in times of banking crises.
When deposit insurance coverage was limited to 20K depositors tended to bunch just below the 20K
coverage limit. Once coverage is increased to 100K, however, 100K bunching largely substitutes
this 20K bunching. In fact, depositors even start bunching at 100K just before the coverage was
effectively raised to 100K, suggesting there were some anticipation effects. This 100K bunching
behavior fades away during the period of nationalization with its implicit blanket guarantees, but
returns in full force once the bank is re-privatized and the new 100k coverage limit applies to
the bank’s depositors, providing clear evidence that depositors are well aware of changes in bank
ownership and deposit insurance and react rationally to these changes.
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Figures
Figure 1. Google Trends – deposit insurance, bank name, nationalization and privatization
Notes: The first panel shows the search interest in the term ’depositogarantie’ (which is the Dutch word for ’deposit
insurance’). The second panel shows the search interest in the bank name (which we cannot reveal) as it appears
in Dutch or French and the third panel search interest in the terms ’nationalisatie’ (which is the Dutch word for
’nationalization’) represented by the black line and ’privatisering’ (which is the Dutch word for ’privatization’)
represented by the gray line. The vertical axis indicates the search interest in each month compared to the highest
point in the figure. A value of 100 is the peak popularity for that term and 0 if there is not enough information. The
sample in the first and third panel is restricted to Flanders and Brussels where Dutch in an official language, while
the sample in the second panel also includes Wallonia where French is the official language.
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Note: Total deposits expressed in billions.























































Note: From left to right, total deposits expressed in billions for depositors with deposits below 20K, deposits between
20K and 100K, deposits above 100K.
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Figure 4. Distribution deposits around 20K and 100K by period
(a) Before increase deposit insurance
(b) After increase deposit insurance & bank nationalization
(c) After bank privatization
Notes: Distribution of deposits around 20K (left) and 100K (right). First panel before the increase in deposit
insurance. Second panel after the increase in deposit insurance and during the period of state-ownership. Third
panel after the increase in deposit insurance and re-privatization.
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Figure 5. Pretreatment trend
Notes: Average of the individuals’ deposit growth rates for treatment (gray line) and control group (black line). The
sample is restricted to deposits ∈ ]10K,100K].
Figure 6. Treatment effect over time
Notes: Treatment effect on deposit growth and 95% confidence interval based on column 1 of table A.2. Gray shaded
areas encompass the impact of the Lehman bankruptcy, the increase in coverage during the period of state ownership
and the increase in coverage after re-privatization.
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Notes: The blue (black) line depicts the predictive margins for the treatment (control) group given the relationship
strength. The panels are based on table 7. The first (second) panel shows the predictive margins during the periods
of state and private ownership, respectively.
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Figure 8. Predictive margins during state and private ownership given trust in government
Nationalization Privatization
Notes: The blue (black) line depicts the predictive margins for the treatment (control) group given the trust level
measured as the number of valid votes divided by total votes. The trust variable is scaled by subtracting the minimum
and dividing by the range. The panels are based on column 3 of table 8. The first (second) panel shows the predictive
margins during the periods of state and private ownership, respectively.
Figure 9. Bunching below thresholds
Note: Left (Right) figure shows bunching below 20K (100K).
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Tables
Table 1. Summary statistics
variable N mean sd min max
dependent variable
Δ ln(deposits) 2,155,164 -0.065 0.611 -16.056 6.398
main variables
state 2,155,164 0.288 0.453 0 1
private 2,155,164 0.353 0.478 0 1
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] 2,155,164 0.227 0.419 0 1
deposits ∈ ]20K,40K] 2,155,164 0.145 0.352 0 1
deposits ∈ ]40K,60K] 2,155,164 0.049 0.217 0 1
deposits ∈ ]60K,80K] 2,155,164 0.022 0.145 0 1
deposits ∈ ]80K,100K] 2,155,164 0.011 0.104 0 1
deposits ∈ ]100K,200K] 2,183,278 0.013 0.113 0 1
depositor characteristics
mortgage now 2,155,164 0.147 0.354 0 1
mortgage ever 2,155,164 0.248 0.432 0 1
number products 2,155,164 5.708 3.845 0 55
scope 2,155,164 2.680 1.294 0 5
change branch 2,155,164 0.061 0.240 0 1
change account manager 2,155,164 0.101 0.301 0 1
account manager 2,155,164 0.490 0.500 0 1
leave account manager 2,155,164 0.039 0.194 0 1
contact ever 2,155,164 0.868 0.338 0 1
sales ever 2,155,164 0.538 0.499 0 1
contacts last year 2,155,164 1.711 2.071 0 67
depositor characteristics
widow 2,154,473 0.003 0.053 0 1
divorce 2,154,473 0.006 0.080 0 1
wedding 2,154,473 0.008 0.091 0 1
married man 2,155,164 0.289 0.453 0 1
married woman 2,155,164 0.184 0.387 0 1
income 2,155,164 0.697 0.460 0 1
no income 2,155,164 0.303 0.460 0 1
income ∈ ]0,2K] 2,155,164 0.464 0.499 0 1
income ∈ ]2K,3.5K] 2,155,164 0.173 0.378 0 1
income ∈ ]5K,∞[ 2,155,164 0.017 0.129 0 1
moved 2,155,164 0.055 0.228 0 1
branch characteristics
branch merge 2,155,164 0.033 0.178 0 1
branch relocation 2,155,164 0.006 0.077 0 1
branch status change 2,155,164 0.010 0.098 0 1
district competitors 2,155,164 0.919 1.764 0 12
district potential 2,155,164 2.641 1.043 0 5
regional characteristics




Δ ln(depositsi,t+1) Δ ln(depositsi,t+1) Δ ln(depositsi,t+1)
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] -0.277*** -0.276*** -0.278***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
state 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
state*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] 0.003 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
private 0.009*** 0.012*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
private*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] 0.024*** 0.021*** 0.024***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)




Number of observations 2,155,164 2,154,473 2,154,473
Number of customers 160,546 160,504 160,504
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-difference of the natural logarithm of deposits. Deposits
∈ ]20K,100K] is a dummy that equals 1 for deposits between 20K and 100K, state is a dummy
equal to 1 for the period during which the deposit insurance was increased and the bank was
nationalized and private is a dummy equal to 1 for the period following the bank privatization.
The regressions further control for individual fixed effects. The sample is restricted to deposits
between 1K and 100K six months preceding the deposit increase until six months after the bank
privatization. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3. Percentage growth rates
private bank state bank private bank
20K insured 100K insured 100K insured
deposits ∈ ]10K,20K] -0.01 -0.003 -0.001
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] -0.287 -0.277 -0.254
Δ -0.277*** -0.274*** -0.253***
Notes: Based on significant coefficient in column 1 of table 2. The significance
of the difference in growth rates between control and treatment group is tested
at the bottom of the table.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4. Robustness window, deposit value and anticipation effects
9 months 4 months deposits ∈ ]5K,100K] deposits ∈ ]10K,100K] anticipation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Δ ln(deposits) Δ ln(deposits) Δ ln(deposits) Δ ln(deposits) Δ ln(deposits)
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] -0.219*** -0.333*** -0.197*** -0.146*** -0.276***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
state 0.001 0.011*** -0.004*** -0.009*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
state*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] 0.000 -0.001 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
private 0.006*** 0.022*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
private*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] 0.021*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.021***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Constant 0.149*** 0.212*** 0.091*** 0.075*** 0.163***
(0.011) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.015)
Controls x x x x x
Number of observations 2,795,458 1,637,712 1,318,094 898,714 2,154,473
Number of customers 165,502 154,750 108,920 79,658 160,504
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-difference of the natural logarithm of deposits. Deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] is a dummy that
equals 1 for deposits between 20K and 100K, state is a dummy equal to 1 for the period during which the deposit insurance was
increased and the bank was nationalized and private is a dummy equal to 1 for the period following the bank privatization. The
regressions further control for individual fixed effects. The sample is restricted to deposits between 1K and 100K six months preceding
the deposit increase until six months after the bank privatization. In the first (second) column the sample is restricted to deposits
between 1K and 100K nine (four) months preceding the deposit increase until nine (four) months after the bank privatization. The
sample in column 3 (4) is restricted to deposits between 5K (10K) and 100K six months preceding the deposit increase until six months
after the bank privatization. Column 5 redefines state. The dummy in the last column is equal to 1 for the period during which the
deposit insurance was increased and the bank was nationalized including the month before. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5. Exogeneity treatment status
fixed treatment status without deposits ∈ [10K,30K]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ ln(deposits) Δ ln(deposits) Δ ln(deposits) Δ ln(deposits)
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] -0.112*** -0.111*** -0.591*** -0.591***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
state 0.002* 0.003** 0.006*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
state*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] 0.011*** 0.009*** -0.008** -0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
private 0.000 0.003** 0.008*** 0.011***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
private*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant -0.046*** 0.111*** 0.034*** 0.211***
(0.001) (0.015) (0.002) (0.019)
Controls x x
Number of observations 1,974,994 1,974,303 1,536,257 1,535,650
Number of customers 159,115 159,073 140,594 140,557
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-difference of the natural logarithm of deposits. Deposits ∈
]20K,100K] is a dummy that equals 1 for deposits between 20K and 100K, state is a dummy equal
to 1 for the period during which the deposit insurance was increased and the bank was nationalized
and private is a dummy equal to 1 for the period following the bank privatization. The regressions
further control for individual fixed effects. The sample is restricted to deposits between 1K and 100K
six months preceding the deposit increase until six months after the bank privatization. The first
two columns are further without individuals changing from treatment status within treatment period
and the last two columns without deposits between 10,000 and 30,000 euros. Robust standard errors
in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6. Abadie DiD
(1) (2)






Number of observations 114,777 112,754
Notes: The first and second panel provide the ATT of increased de-
posit insurance during respectively nationalization and privatization.
The baseline in both panels is the period before the increase of deposit
insurance and the depositors with deposits between 20K and 100K
are part of the treatment group. The dependent variable is average
deposit growth within a treatment period minus the average deposit
growth in the baseline period. State is a dummy equal to 1 for the
period during which the deposit insurance was increased and the bank
was nationalized and private is a dummy equal to 1 for the period
following the bank privatization. In column 1, all controls used to ad-
dress nonrandom selection into treatment groups and column 2 also
includes the month fixed effects. The sample is restricted to deposits
between 1K and 100K six months preceding the deposit increase un-
til six months after the bank privatization. Individuals who change
from treatment status within a treatment period are dropped from the
sample. Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7. Relationship strength
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ ln(deposits) Δ ln(deposits) Δ ln(deposits) Δ ln(deposits)
scope nbrproducts mortgage now income
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] -0.354*** -0.266*** -0.284*** -0.330***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008)
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K]*relationship 0.026*** -0.001 0.047*** 0.069***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.008) (0.009)
state -0.018*** -0.017*** 0.003*** -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
state*relationship 0.010*** 0.005*** 0.033*** 0.018***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.002)
state*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.005** 0.006
(0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005)
state*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K]*relationship -0.007*** -0.003*** -0.031*** -0.009*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.005)
private -0.012*** -0.012*** 0.008*** 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
private*relationship 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.028*** 0.016***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.002)
private*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] 0.037*** 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.029***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
private*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K]*relationship -0.007*** -0.002*** -0.027*** -0.013**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.005)
relationship -0.052*** 0.000 0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.011) (0.006)
Constant 0.179*** 0.163*** 0.159*** 0.153***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Controls x x x x
Number of observations 2,154,473 2,154,473 2,154,473 2,154,473
Number of customers 160,504 160,504 160,504 160,504
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-difference of the natural logarithm of deposits. Deposits ∈ ]20K,100K]
is a dummy that equals 1 for deposits between 20K and 100K, state is a dummy equal to 1 for the period
during which the deposit insurance was increased and the bank was nationalized and private is a dummy equal
to 1 for the period following the bank privatization, scope is the number of product domains of the subject,
mortgage now dummy equal to 1 in those time periods where the subject has a mortgage, income dummy equal
to 1 if regular income is not missing or zero and nbrproducts is the number of products the subject has. The
regressions further control for individual fixed effects. The sample is restricted to deposits between 1K and 100K
six months preceding the deposit increase until six months after the bank privatization. Robust standard errors
in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8. Bank nationalization and trust in government
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ ln(deposits) Δ ln(deposits) Δ ln(deposits) Δ ln(deposits)
trust 0.029 0.041 0.056 0.068
(0.060) (0.061) (0.060) (0.061)
state -0.013** -0.011* -0.022*** -0.020***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
state*trust 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.036*** 0.035***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
private -0.003 0.001 -0.005 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
private*trust 0.020*** 0.018** 0.018** 0.016*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] -0.231*** -0.230***
(0.023) (0.023)
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K]*trust -0.055** -0.055**
(0.027) (0.027)
state*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] 0.031** 0.031**
(0.013) (0.013)
state*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K]*trust -0.036** -0.038**
(0.017) (0.017)
private*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] 0.014 0.013
(0.013) (0.013)
private*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K]*trust 0.012 0.010
(0.016) (0.016)
Constant -0.097** 0.067 -0.055 0.102**
(0.048) (0.050) (0.048) (0.050)
Controls x x
Number of observations 2,131,265 2,130,666 2,131,265 2,130,666
Number of customers 158,846 158,810 158,846 158,810
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-difference of the natural logarithm of deposits. Deposits ∈
]20K,100K] is a dummy that equals 1 for deposits between 20K and 100K, state is a dummy equal to
1 for the period during which the deposit insurance was increased and the bank was nationalized and de-
posit insurance was increased, private is a dummy equal to 1 for the period following the bank privatization
and deposit insurance was increased, trust is the number of valid votes divided by the total number of votes.
The trust variable is scaled by subtracting the minimum and dividing by the range. The regressions further
control for individual fixed effects. The sample is restricted to deposits between 1K and 100K six months
preceding the deposit increase until six months after the bank privatization. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9. Percentage growth rates, trust regressions
private bank state bank private bank
20K insured 100K insured 100K insured
All C T All C T All C T
trustmin -0.097 -0.055 -0.286 -0.11 -0.077 -0.277 -0.097 -0.06 -0.277
trustmax -0.068 0.001 -0.286 -0.051 0.015 -0.276 -0.051 0.014 -0.246
Δ 0.029 0.056 0.001 0.059 0.092 0.001 0.049 0.074 0.031
Notes: Deposit growth rates based on columns 1 and 3 of table 8. Trust is the number
of valid votes divided by the total number of votes. The trust variables are scaled by
subtracting the minimum and dividing by the range. The minimum is 0 and the maximum
is 1. C and T refer respectively to control and treatment group.
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Appendix
Figure A.1. Histogram of the trust variable
Notes: Trust is the number of valid votes divided by the total number of votes. The variable is scaled by subtracting
the minimum and dividing by the range.
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Table A.1. Variable description
variable description
dependent variable
Δ ln(deposits) deposit growth rate
main variables
state dummy that equals 1 for the period during which the deposit insurance was increased and the
bank was nationalized
private dummy that equals 1 for the period during which the deposit insurance was increased and the
bank was privatized
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] dummy that equals 1 if deposits between 20K and 100K
deposits ∈ ]20K,40K] dummy that equals 1 if deposits between 20K and 40K
deposits ∈ ]40K,60K] dummy that equals 1 if deposits between 40K and 60K
deposits ∈ ]60K,80K] dummy that equals 1 if deposits between 60K and 80K
deposits ∈ ]80K,100K] dummy that equals 1 if deposits between 80K and 100K
deposits ∈ ]100K,200K] dummy that equals 1 if deposits between 100K and 200K
relationship banking
mortgage now dummy that equals 1 in those time periods where the subject has a mortgage
mortgage ever dummy that equals 1 if the subject has ever had a mortgage with the bank
number products number of products the subject has had at this point in time
scope number of product domains of the subject
change branch dummy equals 1 if the subject changes branch at this point in time (*)
change account manager dummy equals 1 if the subject gets a new account manager at this point in time (*)
account manager dummy equals 1 if the subject has an account manager at this point in time
leave account manager dummy equals 1 if the account manager of the subject leaves at this point in time (*)
contact ever dummy equals 1 if the subject has ever had face-to-face contact with branch
sales ever dummy equals 1 if the subject has ever had sales
contacts last year number of face-to-face contacts during last 12 months
depositor characteristics
widow dummy equals 1 if the subject becomes widow(er) at this point in time (*)
divorce dummy equals 1 if the subject is divorced at this point in time (*)
wedding dummy equals 1 if the subject marries at this point in time (*)
married man dummy equals 1 for married men
married woman dummy equals 1 for married women
no income dummy equals 1 if regular income is missing or zero
income dummy equals 1 if regular income is higher than 0
income ∈ ]0,2K] dummy equals 1 if regular income is higher than 0 and smaller or equal to 2000
income ∈ ]2K,3.5K] dummy equals 1 if regular income is higher than 2000 and smaller or equal to 3500
income ∈ ]5K,∞[ dummy equals 1 if regular income higher than 5000
moved dummy equals 1 if the subject moves at this point in time (*)
branch characteristics
branch merge dummy equals 1 if branch merges at this point in time (monthly data) (*)
branch relocation dummy equals 1 if branch relocates at this point in time (monthly data) (*)
branch status change dummy equals 1 if branch changes statute (statutory or independent) at this point in time
(yearly data) (*)
district competitors number of competing banks available to subject in this district (data for 2008)
for 2005 until 2009, we use the level of 2008
district potential market potential of the district as estimated by the bank (data for 2005, 2006, 2008, 2010 and
2011), 5 levels: 1–5
regional characteristics
trust number of valid votes divided by the total number of votes
the variable is scaled by subtracting the minimum and dividing by the range
Note: (*) dummy kept at 1 during 12 months.
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Table A.2. Treament effect by period
(1) (2)
Δ ln(depositsi,t+1) Δ ln(depositsi,t+1)
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] -0.269*** -0.271***
(0.004) (0.004)
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K]*Ds−6 -0.008* -0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K]*Ds−5 0.006 0.009*
(0.005) (0.005)
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K]*Ds−4 0.007 0.010**
(0.005) (0.005)
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K]*Ds−3 -0.045*** -0.043***
(0.006) (0.006)
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K]*Ds−2 -0.023*** -0.021***
(0.005) (0.005)
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K]*Ds−1 -0.012** -0.010**
(0.005) (0.005)
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K]*Ds -0.014*** -0.013***
(0.004) (0.004)
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K]*Ds+1 -0.017*** -0.017***
(0.004) (0.004)
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K]*Ds+2 -0.014*** -0.014***
(0.004) (0.004)
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K]*Ds+4 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K]*Ds+5 -0.026*** -0.026***
(0.004) (0.004)
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K]*Ds+6 -0.018*** -0.019***
(0.004) (0.004)
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K]*Ds+7 0.029*** 0.028***
(0.004) (0.004)
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K]*Ds+8 0.033*** 0.032***
(0.004) (0.004)
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K]*Ds+9 0.034*** 0.033***
(0.004) (0.004)






Number of observations 2,155,164 2,154,473
Number of customers 160,546 160,504
β5/2008 + β6/2008 + β7/2008 + β8/2008 + β9/2008 + β10/2008 = 0 15.59*** 10.3***
β5/2008 + β6/2008 + β7/2008 + β8/2008 + β9/2008 = 0 14.84*** 9.67***
β5/2008 + β6/2008 + β7/2008 + β8/2008 + β10/2008 = 0 10.09*** 5.91**
β5/2008 + β6/2008 + β7/2008 + β9/2008 + β10/2008 = 0 3.28* 1.19
β5/2008 + β6/2008 + β7/2008 + β8/2008 = 0 8.47*** 4.67**
β5/2008 + β6/2008 + β7/2008 + β9/2008 = 0 1.66 0.32
β5/2008 + β6/2008 + β7/2008 + β10/2008 = 0 0.21 0.07
β5/2008 + β6/2008 + β7/2008 = 0 0.27 1.56
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-difference of the natural logarithm of deposits. Deposits ∈
]20K,100K] is a dummy that equals 1 for deposits between 20K and 100K. D captures each period within
the sample and s=0 in the month of the deposit increase. The regressions further control for individual
fixed effects. The sample is restricted to deposits between 1K and 100K six months preceding the deposit
increase until six months after the bank privatization. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.3. Subgroups deposits ∈ ]20K,100K]
(1) (2)
Δ ln(deposits) Δ ln(deposits)
deposits ∈ ]20K,40K] -0.233*** -0.232***
(0.003) (0.003)
deposits ∈ ]40K,60K] -0.376*** -0.375***
(0.006) (0.006)
deposits ∈ ]60K,80K] -0.479*** -0.480***
(0.009) (0.009)




state*deposits ∈ ]20K,40K] -0.003 -0.005*
(0.003) (0.003)
state*deposits ∈ ]40K,60K] -0.010** -0.012***
(0.005) (0.005)
state*deposits ∈ ]60K,80K] 0.006 0.004
(0.007) (0.007)




private*deposits ∈ ]20K,40K] 0.020*** 0.017***
(0.002) (0.002)
private*deposits ∈ ]40K,60K] 0.025*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.004)
private*deposits ∈ ]60K,80K] 0.035*** 0.031***
(0.007) (0.007)





Number of observations 2,155,164 2,154,473
Number of customers 160,546 160,504
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-difference of the natural
logarithm of deposits. Deposits ∈ ]20K,40K] is a dummy that
equals 1 for deposits between 20K and 40K, state is a dummy
equal to 1 for the period during which the deposit insurance was
increased and the bank was nationalized and private is a dummy
equal to 1 for the period following the bank privatization. The
regressions further control for individual fixed effects. The sample
is restricted to deposits between 1K and 100K six months preceding
the deposit increase until six months after the bank privatization.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.4. Including deposits ∈ ]100K,200K]
(1) (2)
Δ ln(depositsi,t+1) Δ ln(depositsi,t+1)
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] -0.282*** -0.281***
(0.003) (0.003)




statet*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] 0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.002)




privatet*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] 0.025*** 0.022***
(0.002) (0.002)





Number of observations 2,183,278 2,182,587
Number of customers 161,383 161,341
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-difference of the natural logarithm
of deposits. Deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] is a dummy that equals 1 for deposits
between 20K and 100K, state is a dummy equal to 1 for the period during
which the deposit insurance was increased and the bank was nationalized and
private is a dummy equal to 1 for the period following the bank privatization.
The regressions further control for individual fixed effects. The sample is re-
stricted to deposits between 1K and 100K six months preceding the deposit
increase until six months after the bank privatization. Robust standard errors
in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.5. Averaged data
treatment status at time t no changes in treatment status
within treatment period










deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] -0.153*** -0.152*** -0.097*** -0.097***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
state 1.797*** 1.797*** 1.798*** 1.797***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
state*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
private 1.492*** 1.492*** 1.494*** 1.494***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
private*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.024*** 0.022***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.022*** 0.103*** 0.011*** 0.084***
(0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.009)
Controls x x
Number of observations 381,518 381,396 350,024 349,902
Number of customers 149,772 149,731 147,802 147,761
Notes: Notes: The dependent variable is the first-difference of the natural logarithm of deposits at time
t (start of treatment period) and t+s (end of treatment period). For the calculation of the dependent
variable, data six months preceding the deposit increase until six months after the bank privatization is
employed. Deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] is a dummy that equals 1 for deposits between 20K and 100K, state
is a dummy equal to 1 for the period during which the deposit insurance was increased and the bank
was nationalized and private is a dummy equal to 1 for the period following the bank privatization. The
regressions further control for individual fixed effects. The sample is restricted to deposits between 1K and
100K and the first month of each treatment period. The last two columns further restricts the sample to
customers who did not change from treatment status within a treatment period. Robust standard errors
in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
41
Table A.6. Clustered se
postal code substreet
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ ln(deposits) Δ ln(deposits) Δ ln(deposits) Δ ln(deposits)
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] -0.276*** -0.275*** -0.276*** -0.275***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
state 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
state*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
private 0.011*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
private*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.020***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant -0.009*** 0.154*** -0.009*** 0.236***
(0.001) (0.021) (0.001) (0.043)
Controls x x
Number of observations 2,038,496 2,037,899 1,992,619 1,991,950
Number of customers 152,314 152,278 149,078 149,037
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-difference of the natural logarithm of deposits. Deposits ∈
]20K,100K] is a dummy that equals 1 for deposits between 20K and 100K, state is a dummy equal
to 1 for the period during which the deposit insurance was increased and the bank was nationalized
and private is a dummy equal to 1 for the period following the bank privatization. The regressions
further control for individual fixed effects. The sample is restricted to deposits between 1K and 100K
six months preceding the deposit increase until six months after the bank privatization. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at postal code level in the first two columns and in the last two
columns at substreet code.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
42
Table A.7. Placebo test
24 months before 12 months before
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ ln(deposits) Δ ln(deposits) Δ ln(deposits) Δ ln(deposits)
deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] -0.223*** -0.226*** -0.243*** -0.245***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
state -0.017*** -0.012*** -0.007*** -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
state*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] -0.062*** -0.060*** -0.023*** -0.022***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
private -0.029*** -0.016*** -0.054*** -0.045***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
private*deposits ∈ ]20K,100K] -0.043*** -0.039*** -0.048*** -0.047***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.017*** 0.154*** 0.010*** 0.135***
(0.001) (0.013) (0.001) (0.014)
Controls x x
Number of observations 2,149,246 2,148,542 2,241,247 2,240,511
Number of customers 164,202 164,158 164,037 163,994
Notes: The dependent variable is the first-difference of the natural logarithm of deposits. Deposits
∈ ]20K,100K] is a dummy that equals 1 for deposits between 20K and 100K. In columns 1 and 2 (3
and 4), state is a dummy equal to 1 24 (12) months preceding the period during which the deposit
insurance was increased and the bank was nationalized and private is a dummy equal to 1 24 (12)
months preceding the period during which the bank was privatized. The regressions further control
for individual fixed effects. The sample in columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) is 24 (12) months before the
baseline sampling period. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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